Chapter 1589 Western Sahara

In the entire African continent, only Northwest Africa is difficult for East Africa to influence from land. First, it is too far away from East Africa. Second, the geographical environment in the middle is too harsh and the transportation is very backward. Finally, Northwest Africa has the support of European countries.

Northeast Africa is obviously different. For example, in the direction of Egypt, East Africa can enter Egypt along the Nile River or through Darfur.

Although Egypt also has the support of the British, Britain itself is very far away from Egypt. They can control Egypt through the ocean and suppress those European countries that have the same ambitions for Egypt, which is already the limit. If the enemy comes from inland or East Africa, all Britain can do is watch helplessly.

After the opening of the North African Railway, other parts of Northeast Africa also found it difficult to resist the military offensive from the East African land.

Obviously, Italy, which is cooperating with East Africa to develop the North African railway, also knows this truth, but why does Italy want to take the risk of "inviting a wolf into the house" and cooperate with East Africa!

Ultimately, it all comes down to Italy having too few options and insufficient understanding of Libya.

The reason why Italy chose Libya as its colony was essentially because the Italian nation was unified too late, lacked strength, and ended up leaving too late. If possible, Benito would obviously prefer to choose Tunisia, Algeria, or French Libya as his colonies.

Even if Italian Libya is developed to the fullest extent, it can only support a population of about one million or so, which is a drop in the bucket for Italy, which has a population of more than 40 million.

At the same time, Libya’s oil resources have not yet been fully explored, so Italy is guarding a treasure trove without realizing it.

In the past, Libya’s oil resources were developed after the 1950s, some time after the end of World War II.

Therefore, compared with the large number of practical benefits that can be seen from cooperation with East Africa, Italy does not attach much importance to the security of Libya, this "bad land".

After the opening of the North African railway, Italy will be able to get a share of the trade in East Africa and Europe, two important world markets. At the same time, Italy can also consolidate its own food, energy, resource security and other aspects through this new trade route.

Of course, the construction of the North African railway itself is also conducive to strengthening Italy's control over Italian Libya. However, the economy and population of Italian Libya are basically concentrated on the coast, so it is not very important to Italy.

Italy can benefit from cooperating with East Africa, and it can also accept the strategic risks. Even if East Africa is really ambitious to annex Libya, it will not be painful for Italy, so Italy will naturally choose the former.

…

In Northeast Africa, East Africa is accelerating the construction of the North African Railway, diversifying trade routes to Europe, and strengthening its influence in North Africa and the Mediterranean. In Northwest Africa, East Africa has also taken action this year.

January 11, 1935.

In Northwest Africa, there is a place that is extremely easy to be overlooked. This is Western Sahara, which is currently a Spanish colony.

East Africa has set its sights on Western Sahara, more specifically, Dakhla, the Spanish colonial outpost in Western Sahara.

Dakhla is a bay extending from the Western Sahara, with a narrow Rio de Oro Peninsula formed on the west side of the bay. This peninsula is like a huge natural breakwater, providing shelter for the Dakhla Bay and resisting the waves directly from the Atlantic Ocean.

Of course, Spain calls it Villa Cisneros.

In late 1934, the East African government and Spain made a deal for Villa Cisneros, also known as Dakhla, to establish an East African forward base in Northwest Africa.

In fact, negotiations between the two countries had begun as early as 1931, but Spain's price was too high and East Africa did not accept it. However, as the situation in Spain became increasingly chaotic, both the Republicans and the Nationalists hoped to gain East Africa's support. Finally, at the end of 1934, Spain sold Dakhla to East Africa at a price almost free of charge, that is, 20,000 Rhine guilders.

Dakhla Castle, which was previously Spain's only stronghold on the peninsula, was actually a small military outpost built to express Spain's ownership of Western Sahara. It has now been taken over by the Leipzig Lieutenant in East Africa.

Looking at the desolate land outside the castle and the vast sea, Lieutenant Leipzig found it difficult to cheer up.

Lieutenant Leipzig said to his subordinates, "Before arriving here, I heard we bought a piece of land from Spain, but it was only in Western Sahara. At the time, I didn't think much of it, but when I got here, I realized how serious the problem we were facing was!"

As a naval officer of the Atlantic Fleet, Lieutenant Leipzig had some understanding of Western Sahara, because the coast of Western Sahara was an important route from East Africa to Europe.

This area falls within the scope of the East African Navy's activities, so the East African Atlantic Navy will naturally have a rough understanding of the local environment.

However, after arriving in Dakhla, Lieutenant Leipzig found that his understanding of Western Sahara was not very in-depth.

He said: "This is really not a place for human habitation. Although there are many military bases in desert areas in East Africa, those places at least have rivers or oases. But Dakhla is a completely barren land surrounded by sea on three sides. The only place connecting to the mainland is also an endless desert with no grass to be seen."

"I dare say the conditions here are a hundred times worse than those in Siberia in the Soviet Union."

Being exiled is the true psychological portrayal of the East African officers and soldiers in Dakhla. Even the officer Leipzig finds it difficult to tolerate this.

East Africa is not without deserts, and there are also military bases along the coast. For example, there are many military outposts along the coast of Namibia in East Africa.

However, the conditions in Dakhla are far inferior to those on the coast of Namibia. Although the coast of Namibia is also desert and ocean, at least the military outpost is built within the country and is basically located on the mainland.

Although Dakhla is located on a peninsula, it is not much different from an island. Many areas of the peninsula are less than two kilometers wide, but more than 40 kilometers long. Dakhla is located at the southern end of this narrow peninsula.

Now, there are only more than a hundred East African officers and soldiers in the entire peninsula, and they can hardly communicate with the outside world.

This is easy to understand. Even after Western Sahara's independence in the past, until the 21st century, the total population of more than 200,000 square kilometers of land was only a few hundred thousand. You have to know that Western Sahara is an area that believes in Arabism, so you can imagine how bad the environment here is.

In 1935, the vast territory and sparse population of Western Sahara reached an outrageous level. Even by the most optimistic estimate, the local population would not exceed 50,000.

This makes it easy to understand why Spain sold Dakhla and the entire Rio de Oro Peninsula, nearly 50 square kilometers of land, to East Africa at an ultra-low price of only 40,000 Rhine guilders.

From an economic perspective, although 40,000 Rhine guilders is a small amount, Spain still made a profit because there was no output at all locally.

East Africa was forced to do this "loss-making" business.

Lieutenant Leipzig's deputy, Kerlen, said, "Given the Empire's current conditions, it is indeed difficult to find a suitable place to settle in Northwest Africa. It is not easy for Spain to sell Dakhla to us."

"With Dakhla, the Empire now has its first military base in Northwest Africa, ending the Empire's long-term lack of a foothold along the coast of Northwest Africa."

East Africa’s obsession with obtaining ports in Northwest Africa is profound. East Africa’s northernmost military base on the east coast of the Atlantic Ocean is the Port of Lomé in Togoland.

However, the East African Navy previously had no base along the nearly 5,000-kilometer west coast of Africa, from the Port of Lomé to the Iberian Peninsula in Europe. This was obviously a huge disadvantage for maintaining East Africa's maritime interests, especially trade with Western Europe.

There are many reasons why East Africa has long found it difficult to acquire ports and military bases on the west coast of Africa north of the port of Lomé in Togo.

The most critical of these are the colonial powers in West Africa and North Africa, which are quite wary of East Africa. These countries include Britain, France, Portugal and the United States.

Needless to say, Britain and France have the most colonies in West Africa and Northwest Africa, but now Britain and France have increased their attention to these colonies, and both countries are powerful countries and are not willing to let East Africa enter the local area.

Portugal's main colonies in the region are Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. Due to historical grievances with East Africa, Portugal is the country in the entire region least likely to sell or lease ports to East Africa.

Even though East Africa and Portugal have reconciled now, Portugal is obviously unwilling to invite a wolf into the house. Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde are already Portugal's only remaining important colonies, and it does not want the past events of Angola and Mozambique to repeat themselves.

Then there is the United States. The United States also has its own sphere of influence in West Africa, which is Liberia, the eldest son of Africa cultivated by the United States itself.

Kerlen said: "Looking at the entire West and North Africa, there are either relatively independent countries like Britain and France, who are wary of East Africa and have relatively low demands for empire, or countries like Portugal and the United States, which have historical grievances with East Africa or are currently in conflict with it."

"Especially the United States. They don't want East Africa to expand there. After all, the two countries have a major conflict over Atlantic strategy. We have been able to suppress US expansion in South America before. If we have a military base along the coast of Northwest Africa, wouldn't the US be at a greater disadvantage in the competition with the Empire?"

"So, Spain's sale of Dakhla to the Empire is already a timely help. Although the environment here is indeed a bit harsh, it is better than nothing."

Under Kerlen's persuasion, Lieutenant Leipzig's mood calmed down a bit, but he still complained, "But this environment is too bad. If there was a ready-made port here, I wouldn't be so picky."

Although Dakhla was one of the few ports in Western Sahara in the past, in 1935, the construction of Dakhla was extremely backward, or it could be said that it was an undeveloped land that had not been developed at all.

The Spaniards only built a fortress on the peninsula, and usually only a few people lived there. This fortress could not even accommodate Lieutenant Leipzig and his group. At least for the time being, most of them had to spend the night on the ship.

There is no port in Dakhla, so the warships are parked in the bay, and landing requires lowering small boats and rowing to the shore.

Kerlen consoled us, saying, "Think of it this way. At least there's a piece of land here where we can rest. It's better than drifting on the sea. Besides, there's a well in Dakhla that can solve our fresh water problem."

"As for the construction of Dakhla, it's definitely not something we can handle on our own. After all, there's no food here, and we even lack construction materials. We must find a way to transport supplies here from China."

It is obviously impossible for Lieutenant Leipzig and his team to develop and construct Dakhla alone, not to mention that East Africa's plan here is to build a comprehensive military base.

At the same time, Dakhla is not just a military port. In the future, it will also be responsible for providing convenience for merchant ships sailing from East Africa to Europe, such as maintenance, supplies, berthing, etc.

This requires the construction of a modern port in Dakhla, which must be large enough to accommodate large warships.

"For the entire Dakhla, the Empire must build supporting ports, military camps, power supply systems, and even airports and other facilities."

"As the vanguard, our main purpose is to declare the Empire's sovereignty over this area and prevent other countries from interfering or Spain from going back on its word."

"The construction work must be completed by the Empire. Of course, before that, we must first build a temporary living area to ensure survival in the short term."

Lieutenant Leipzig smiled wryly and said, "That requires construction materials. Dakhla is surrounded by sand and seawater. There are rocks, but we don't have any cutting equipment."

"So, at least for the near future, living on the boat is our only option. Of course, we'll also have to send a few people to guard it. This Spanish military outpost may be a little small, but it has everything it needs."

As an almost isolated military stronghold, Spanish soldiers were able to hold this place for a long time in the past. This was mainly due to the fact that Spain was close to this place, so the necessary supplies could be delivered here by sea transport.

Although the conditions in Western Sahara are harsh, Spain has built towns there, and it is not far from Morocco, mainland Spain and some Atlantic islands.

East Africa does not have such conditions. The sea distance from Lomé Port, the nearest port to Dakhla, to Dakhla is more than 3,700 kilometers, which is even farther from the mainland of East Africa.

Therefore, if East Africa wants to complete the occupation and construction of Dakhla, it will cost a huge amount, which is not cost-effective in the eyes of the East African Navy.

Of course, in Ernst's eyes, that was another matter. First of all, East Africa could gain a strategic fulcrum along the coast of Northwest Africa, which was not a loss.

Secondly, Ernst values ​​the potential benefits that Dakhla can bring to East Africa in the future, such as the minerals in Western Sahara, especially important resources such as phosphate and potassium. In the past, Western Sahara's phosphate accounted for one-eighth of the world's total.

Now that East Africa has occupied Dakhla, it will be easier for it to control the phosphate production of Western Sahara in the future. As mentioned before, Dakhla is one of the only few areas in Western Sahara that has port construction. It can become an important transit station for Western Sahara's exports in the future.

Of course, compared with this potential economic value, the acquisition of Dakhla is a key step in East Africa's world strategy. It foreshadows the starting stage of East Africa's future expansion of power in West Africa and North Africa.

(End of this chapter)