Chapter 1149: On-the-spot Response
On paper, tactics seem not only clear, but also explicit and easy to understand; but putting them into practice is another matter.
Djokovic's core tactics revolve around his own forehand and Gawain's forehand. However, in actual matches, the entire tactical arrangement and combination is complex and varied, and the opponent's response is also a variable that must be taken into consideration. Naturally, the situation is not that simple.
But, it worked!
"6:4".
Gao Wen played a series of wonderful shots, and Djokovic also played a series of wonderful shots. The two players went back and forth, and finally relied on key points to decide the first set victory. Djokovic was calmer and more confident at the tactical level, and the entire game layout became clearer.
So Djokovic seized the opportunity and won the first set.
For the crowd watching the excitement, this may not be anything special:
"At the Australian Open, the world number one took the lead after winning the first two sets, but Gao Wen still turned the situation around, overturned the game and won the final victory."
Therefore, there is no need to make a fuss about the outcome of the first set.
But as the person involved, Gao Wen knew that things were not the same.
So far, Djokovic is the player that Gao Wen has faced the most times in his career. He is very clear about the strength and tenacity of the world number one. At the same time, he also has a clear understanding of the world number one's ability and potential. The situation changes slightly every time they meet.
Faintly, Gao Wen could sense Djokovic's tactical changes today.
It is not simply suppressing the backhand or the forehand, but the layout of the entire return line is more complex and more precise, especially the forehand diagonal shot, which makes full use of the entire court and the hitting space, breaks the balance of the ball in the baseline round, and then creates heavy pressure.
In the first set, Gao Wen was still the same Gao Wen, daring to attack and take risks, and his performance was still maintained at a high level.
However, by the sixth meeting, Djokovic had already had a sufficient understanding of Gawain's lines, timing, techniques, etc. While improving the accuracy of his predictions, he also increased the risks of Gawain's adventurous attempts through his own returns, which also reduced the effectiveness of Gawain's offense.
As the game went back and forth, the advantages between Gawaddy and Djokovic changed subtly on some key points.
This shows that it’s not that Gawain played badly, but that Djokovic played too well.
If he were an ordinary player, he might think that "this is normal", that is, it is just a difference in on-the-spot performance. This is the error of the game, and everything is within an acceptable range. Therefore, he only needs to continue to stick to his own steps in the next game.
But not Gawain.
On the surface, everything seemed normal and no different from their previous five encounters. The suspense of victory or defeat often depended on the on-the-spot performance of key points.
In reality, Gao Wen could feel Djokovic's calmness and strength, and the entire tactical layout was clearer and more targeted.
“I cannot see the true appearance of Mount Lu because I am already in it.”
Being in the game, Gao Wen could not see the technical statistics or the overall situation of the game. He could only capture some key points based on his own experience and feelings.
Then, make adjustments.
Gao Wen thought he needed to make some attempts in the second set.
This is undoubtedly bold. Having already lost the first set, shouldn't we go all out in our own way in the second set? Isn't this the safest option?
Gao Wen objected to this.
It is never easy to win against the Big Four, even when they are plagued by injuries and in poor form. Defeating a giant player who is in 70% form may require 120% of the energy of an ordinary player. "Conservatism" cannot and will not be the key to victory.
Moreover, this is a best-of-three match, which is different from the best-of-five format in the Grand Slam. This leaves Gao Wen with less time to fight back, so he needs to be more proactive.
Some risks, some attempts, some breakthroughs are necessary, even if the cost is losing the game.
So, how did Gawain do it? In fact, Gawain was not 100% sure of Djokovic's tactics and the key to this game.
These are all experiences that must be accumulated slowly through one game and one match at a time to develop one's own perception and interpretation of the game. There is no shortcut. Even the Big Four are still constantly learning and growing. This is a lifelong lesson for every professional player.
However, Gawain could feel the pressure from Djokovic’s forehand.
Compared with previous games, Djokovic's forehand attack has improved significantly. For Gao Wen, the pressure from the diagonal and straight lines, shallow and deep areas are all objective. He cannot intuitively feel the impact from the forehand diagonal line. This can only be seen by reviewing the entire game after the game.
Therefore, in order to limit Djokovic's forehand attack, Gao Wen slightly adjusted the layout of his return line: increasing the number of middle returns.
Of course, not all returns should be sent to the middle. This requires layout and combination.
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Starting from the second set, Gao Wen consciously chose the return line, sending the ball unevenly towards the central area to change the entire structure.
The reason is simple: Djokovic does not have a strong forehand.
Violent forehand players like Federer, Del Potro and Tsonga are actually not afraid of returning the ball in the middle, because in the central area, their footsteps can be adjusted in time. With a slight step forward, they can find offensive space and then use their forehand to open up the angle.
Therefore, when playing against them, you often need to send the return ball to both ends as much as possible, mobilize them as much as possible, break their balance, disrupt their footwork, and weaken the power of their forehand.
For players like Kei Nishikori, Ferrer and Simon, whose forehand is relatively weak, if they send the tennis ball to both ends, they can use the inertia of the sprint and the force of the impact to increase the speed of attack, and their forehand can create a stronger attack.
However, if the tennis ball is sent to the central area, firstly, their space for leverage is compressed and they need to exert more strength on their own; secondly, when returning the ball in the middle area, there is not much room for opening an angle, and the control becomes more difficult. If they are not careful, the ball may go directly out of the sideline, leading to an offensive error.
Djokovic belongs to the latter.
The detail is that Djokovic, like Murray, has a certain offensive ability even when facing a return ball in the middle, which should be between the former and the latter; but both Djokovic and Murray do not have such a strong offensive will and are accustomed to fighting at the baseline.
In other words, they will not act rashly unless there is a particularly good opportunity.
In the first set, Gawain ran all over the court and attacked vigorously, but Djokovic's forehand attack was not to be outdone and he fought back sharply.
In the second set, Gawain's edge weakened, the angle of his return ball became much narrower, and the proportion of Djokovic's active attacks also dropped significantly.
This is adjustment.
(End of this chapter)